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Protocol Wealth Comment Letter - SEC Proposed Custody Rule - S7-2026-35

Adviser and Regulated Fund Custody Rules; Crypto Custody Rules, Release Nos. IA-7023; IC-36353; File No. S7-2026-35

By Adam Blumberg

Protocol Wealth Comment Letter - SEC Proposed Custody Rule - S7-2026-35

Protocol Wealth Comment Letter - SEC Proposed Custody Rule - S7-2026-35

Protocol Wealth LLC 201 Milwaukee Street, Suite 200 Denver, CO 80206

October 27, 2026

Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street NE Washington, DC 20549-1090

Submitted via [email protected] (subject line: File Number S7-2026-35)

Re: Adviser and Regulated Fund Custody Rules; Crypto Custody Rules, Release Nos. IA-7023; IC-36353; File No. S7-2026-35

Dear Secretary Countryman:

Protocol Wealth LLC ("Protocol Wealth") is an SEC-registered investment adviser (CRD 335298; SEC File No. 801-132382). We are a small firm that provides traditional and digital asset advisory services. Item 15 of our Form ADV Part 2A describes the multi-party computation ("MPC") wallet arrangement we use for some clients' onchain crypto assets, quoted in Part 1 below. We appreciate the opportunity to comment. Our comments are limited to the proposed adviser self-custody rule (proposed rule 223-1(b)(7)) and the related definition of "self-custody" (proposed rule 223-1(d)(16)), and they respond chiefly to request for comment 68 in section II.A.3.b)(1) ("Key Management") and request for comment 13 in section II.A.1.c) of the release. Part 2, a path within the self-custody rule for arrangements in which the client holds a recoverable share (request for comment 68), is our core request; Part 4, a self-custody trigger based on a controlling share (request for comment 13), is an alternative if the Commission prefers to change the definition instead.

1. Our arrangement, as disclosed in our Form ADV

Our Form ADV Part 2A, Item 15 (brochure dated October 9, 2026), states: "Some clients hold digital assets onchain rather than with a custodian." In that arrangement, a third-party MPC wallet provider holds one key shard and Protocol Wealth holds another. The client holds the backup, secured either through a third-party recovery service or through a recovery phrase the client holds. Item 15 then states, in part: "Protocol Wealth does not hold the backup and cannot recover the wallet on its own." "Transactions are governed by a policy engine." "The client approves the strategies that may be used and the destination addresses that may receive assets." "We can transact only within those approvals, and assets can be sent only to addresses the client has approved." "Because Protocol Wealth cannot send client assets to any destination the client has not approved, and cannot recover or reconstitute a wallet without the client, we do not believe this arrangement gives the firm custody of those assets within the meaning of Rule 206(4)-2." Under the same arrangement, Protocol Wealth and the recovery service, acting together, cannot move client assets without the client.

The same Item states: "Regulators have not issued guidance addressing multi-party computation wallet arrangements of this kind. The position described above is our own interpretation of a rule written for traditional assets. A regulator could reach a different conclusion, in which case additional requirements, including the use of a qualified custodian and an annual surprise examination by an independent public accountant, could apply to these assets."

Separately, Item 15 also states: "Protocol Wealth is deemed to have custody of client assets because we are authorized to deduct our advisory fees from many client accounts."

We describe the arrangement so the Commission has a concrete example in front of it. Request for comment 14 asks whether "wallet solution providers ever need to retain a portion of the user’s key materials", and request for comment 68 asks: "Are commenters aware of any examples of advisers sharing key materials with the client?" Our arrangement involves both a wallet provider and the client holding key materials, but it is not the model request for comment 68 describes, as Part 2 explains.

2. The final rule should permit a non-controlling adviser share where the client holds a recoverable share and controls where assets may go

Request for comment 68 asks: "For example, should the adviser self-custody rule allow the client to have only a non-controlling share of the key materials (i.e., a private key share that is necessary to effectuate a crypto asset transaction but not sufficient for the client to unilaterally move the crypto asset), and only if such private key share is recoverable? Should the adviser self-custody rule require an adviser in such arrangement to obtain explicit client authorization for each transfer of the client’s crypto asset?"

Our arrangement differs from that model, and we want to be plain about how. In the model, the client's share is "necessary to effectuate a crypto asset transaction", so the client takes part in every transfer. In our arrangement, the wallet provider and Protocol Wealth each hold one shard and the client holds the backup (Part 1). Under the sentences quoted in Part 1, the client approves the destinations and holds the backup. The backup is not a signing shard, so the client does not take part in each transfer.

The Commission's own economic analysis of this alternative (section IV.E.10, "Sharing Key Materials") recognizes the benefit of the model: "This alternative could benefit investors by reducing the risk of unauthorized transfer of crypto assets by the adviser, as any movement of a given crypto asset would require the explicit and mutual authorization of both the client and the adviser." We believe that destination control plus client-held recovery achieves the same protection against unauthorized transfer by the adviser: if the adviser cannot move assets to any destination the client has not authorized, and cannot recover or reconstitute the wallet without the client, the adviser cannot send the assets to anyone the client has not approved, even though the client does not authorize each movement. Where the adviser or a related person controls an approved destination, such as an address that receives fees, the client's authorization must also limit the amount sent there (condition 2). The release itself recommends "address verification technology that restricts recipients of crypto asset transfers to authorized and vetted persons (e.g., whitelisting)" (section II.A.3.b)(2)); condition 2 would make that measure a requirement for these arrangements. We support the model request for comment 68 describes, and ask that the final rule also reach the destination-and-recovery model, subject to conditions. The release weighs against the alternative two risks: that sharing "would expose those materials to additional parties that are not subject to the adviser’s supervision and control", and that the client's involvement could delay trading. Both can be addressed by conditions, rather than by prohibiting the structure.

We suggest the final rule permit an adviser to hold a non-controlling share of a client's key materials, outside the exclusivity condition, only if the rule's conditions require all of the following:

  1. No unilateral movement by the adviser. The adviser's key materials, alone, are not sufficient to move the crypto asset.
  2. Client authorization of transfers. The rule should require that the crypto asset can be transferred only with the client's explicit authorization, given either for each transfer or for specific destinations the client has approved in advance; that no destination can be added or changed without the client's explicit authorization; that any transfer to an address controlled by the adviser or a related person, including a fee payment, is limited in amount as well as destination by the client's authorization; and that these restrictions are enforced by the wallet's technical controls, not only by the adviser's procedures. Whether a given arrangement meets this condition is a question of fact the adviser would have to establish. Destination-level authorization addresses the trading-delay concern in section IV.E.10 while keeping the client in control of where assets can go.
  3. Client-held recovery. The client holds a recoverable share or backup, or the backup is secured by a recovery provider that cannot, alone or together with the adviser, move the crypto asset without the client; and the adviser cannot recover or reconstitute the wallet without the client. This answers the condition the Commission itself posed in request for comment 68 ("only if such private key share is recoverable") and addresses the concern that a client-held share could be lost.
  4. Diligence of the wallet provider. Before engaging a wallet provider that holds key materials, the adviser determines, and documents, that the provider cannot, alone or together with the adviser, move a client's crypto asset to a destination the client has not authorized. This builds on the due diligence the release already contemplates in section II.A.1.c)(1) ("Use of Service Providers"). For the same reason, we ask that the final rule replace the wallet-provider proviso's test that the provider "does not have access to the crypto asset’s key materials" with this test: that the provider cannot, alone or together with the adviser, move a client's crypto asset to a destination the client has not authorized (see Part 3).
  5. Disclosure and records. The arrangement, the parties holding key materials and the client's authorization are disclosed to the client in writing and documented in the adviser's books and records.

3. Where no qualified custodian will maintain the asset, the exclusivity condition as proposed would push arrangements like ours toward more adviser control

In section II.A.3.b)(1), the release states: "It is our view that in order to comply with the proposed key management requirement, an adviser must have exclusive possession of the key materials to the crypto asset, as sharing key materials with anyone outside of the adviser would be a violation of the requirement that private key access be limited to supervised persons of the adviser. This also means advisers would not be permitted to share key materials with the client, which is necessary to limit the parameters of access to the private keys and to reduce the risk of inadvertent loss or theft of the key materials."

Section II.A.1.c)(1) adds that a wallet provider may be used only "provided that the service provider of the wallet technology does not have access to the crypto asset’s key materials nor otherwise have the ability to unilaterally move a client’s crypto asset."

As we read the proposal, an adviser holding any shard in an arrangement like ours would have "self-custody" under proposed rule 223-1(d)(16). The adviser would then have to meet the key management requirement, which under the release's reading requires that no one outside the adviser hold key materials. The wallet provider's shard and the client's backup would both fall outside that requirement. Where no qualified custodian will maintain the asset (proposed rule 223-1(b)(7)(i)), the remaining compliant structure would be one in which the adviser's own supervised persons hold all of the key materials. In that structure, the adviser, acting through its designated persons, could move client assets without the client's participation, and the client would no longer hold an independent backup.

We do not think that result serves the purposes the release describes. The release explains that the joint authorization requirement is meant "to reduce the ability of any single bad actor to misappropriate clients’ crypto assets" (section II.A.3.b)(2)). An arrangement in which the client must take part in recovery, and in which the adviser cannot send assets to destinations the client has not approved, applies that same principle across firm lines. Requiring firms to unwind such arrangements in favor of exclusive adviser possession would increase, not reduce, the adviser's practical ability to move client assets. Conditions like those in Part 2 would let the Commission keep the protections of the exclusivity condition where an adviser could otherwise move assets alone, without prohibiting structures that limit the adviser's control.

4. Self-custody should turn on a controlling share, not "any portion" of key materials

Proposed rule 223-1(d)(16) would define self-custody as "possession of any portion of a client crypto asset’s key materials". Request for comment 13 asks: "should self-custody be conferred on an adviser only when the adviser holds all or a controlling share of the key materials? How should a ‘controlling’ private key share be defined for this purpose?"

The release grounds the definition in "a longstanding principle of the definition of custody, under which the Advisers Act custody rule applies when an adviser has the ability to change a client’s ownership and possession of its assets". It gives the example that an adviser holding a client's check payable to a third party "is not subject to the rule solely as a result of holding the check, since the adviser cannot use the check to change ownership of the client’s underlying cash holdings." A non-controlling key share is closer to that check than to a full set of keys: on its own, it cannot change the client's ownership or possession of the asset.

We recognize the release's concern that "an adviser’s possession of even a non-controlling portion of the key materials would subject its client’s crypto assets to custody risks", including loss of a share and coordination among share holders. We suggest the final rule address those risks directly rather than through the custody definition: (i) the rule should define a controlling share as key materials that, alone or together with key materials held by the adviser's related persons or by any person acting on the adviser's instruction, are sufficient to move the crypto asset to a destination the client has not authorized, or to add or change an authorized destination without the client's explicit authorization; and (ii) for an adviser holding a non-controlling share, apply the conditions in Part 2 (including client-held recovery, which addresses loss of the adviser's share) in place of the full self-custody rule. Request for comment 13 itself asks "what protections, if any, should instead apply"; the conditions in Part 2 are our answer.

We appreciate the Commission's consideration of these comments. We are a small adviser and offer them from our own experience with one arrangement. We would be glad to provide further information.

Respectfully submitted,

Adam Blumberg Founding Member, Protocol Wealth LLC

Jason Leupold Founding Member, Protocol Wealth LLC

Nicholas Rygiel Founding Member, Protocol Wealth LLC

Protocol Wealth LLC is an SEC-registered investment adviser (CRD #335298). Content is educational; not investment advice. Full disclosures at/disclosures.